

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

Cornelius Richard Richmond, #B-1180819353, <i>a/k/a Cornelius R. Richmond,</i>	)	C/A No. 8:09-02794-MBS-BHH
	)	
Plaintiff,	)	REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
	)	
v.	)	
	)	
Mr. Bradley C. Richardson, Asst Solicitor of Horry County,	)	
	)	
Defendant.	)	
_____	)	

Cornelius Richard Richmond (Plaintiff) files this civil action *pro se* pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and *in forma pauperis* under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.<sup>1</sup> Plaintiff currently is confined at the J. Reuben Long Detention Center. Plaintiff brings this complaint alleging due process violations and a right to a speedy trial. Plaintiff names Mr. Bradley C. Richardson, an Assistant Solicitor for Horry County, as the defendant. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief.<sup>2</sup>

**Pro Se and In Forma Pauperis Review**

Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of this *pro se* complaint pursuant to the procedural provisions of 28 U.S.C.

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<sup>1</sup>Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e) D.S.C., the undersigned is authorized to review such complaints for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court.

<sup>2</sup>As an alternative to the injunctive relief Plaintiff seeks, he asks to be discharged or released from custody. Plaintiff may not pursue release from custody in an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A pre-trial detainee must seek release from custody in a petition for writ of habeas corpus brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

§§ 1915 and 1915A. This review has been conducted in light of the following precedents: *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); *Estelle v. Gamble*, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); *Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); and *Gordon v. Leeke*, 574 F.2d 1147 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir.). This Court is required to liberally construe *pro se* documents, *Erikson v. Pardus*, 551 U.S. 89 (2007); *Estelle v. Gamble*, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), holding them to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys, *Hughes v. Rowe*, 449 U.S. 9 (1980).

Plaintiff is a *pro se* litigant, and thus his pleadings are accorded liberal construction. Even under this less stringent standard, however, the *pro se* complaint is subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to *pro se* pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so. However, a district court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented, *Barnett v. Hargett*, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999), or construct the plaintiff's legal arguments for him, *Small v. Endicott*, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1993), or “conjure up questions never squarely presented” to the court, *Beaudett v. City of Hampton*, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. *Weller v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv.*, 901 F.2d 387 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1990).

This complaint has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. To protect against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute allows a district court to dismiss the case upon a finding that the

action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted” or is “frivolous or malicious.” § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii). A finding of frivolity can be made where the complaint “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” *Denton v. Hernandez*, 504 U.S. at 31 (1992). Hence, under § 1915(e)(2)(B), a claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed *sua sponte*. *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. at 319; *Allison v. Kyle*, 66 F.3d 71 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995).

### **Discussion**

Plaintiff’s states his claim as follows (verbatim):

I the plaintiff Mr. Cornelius Richard Richmond a pro se litigant inmate that is being held in pre-trial detention is suing Mr. Bradley C. Richardson Asst. Solicitor of Horry County for failing to honour my motion that I filed through the clerk of court for a fast and speedy trial. I am also suing because of my due process rights being violated.

(Compl. at 3.) Liberally construed, it appears that Plaintiff brings this action based on a right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment.

As injunctive relief, Plaintiff requests that this Court move his criminal process along through indictment, grand jury proceedings, and a bond reduction hearing. (Compl. at 5.) He also requests the exclusion of the defendant from participation in Plaintiff’s pending criminal case and that he be taken to trial in an orderly fashion. (Compl. at 5.) However, this relief is unavailable to Plaintiff in a § 1983 action, as a federal court may not award injunctive relief that would affect pending state criminal proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances.

In *Younger v. Harris*, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court held that a federal court should not equitably interfere with state criminal proceedings “except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances.” *Gilliam v. Foster*, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4<sup>th</sup>

Cir. 1996). The *Younger* Court noted that courts of equity should not act unless the moving party has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. *Younger v. Harris*, 401 U.S. at 43-44 (1971). From *Younger* and its progeny, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has culled the following test to determine when abstention is appropriate: “(1) there are ongoing state judicial proceedings; (2) the proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state proceedings.” *Martin Marietta Corp. v. Maryland Comm’n on Human Relations*, 38 F.3d 1392, 1396 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1994) (citing *Middlesex County Ethics Comm’n v. Garden State Bar Ass’n*, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)).

In this case, Plaintiff is clearly involved in an ongoing state criminal proceeding. The second criteria has been addressed by the Supreme Court: “[T]he States’ interest in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of the considerations that should influence a court considering equitable types of relief.” *Kelly v. Robinson*, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986) (citing *Younger v. Harris*, 401 U.S. at 44-45). The Court also decided the third criteria in noting “that ordinarily a pending state prosecution provides the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for vindication of federal constitutional rights.” *Gilliam v. Foster*, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (quoting *Kugler v. Helfant*, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975)). Therefore, Plaintiff’s § 1983 complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

### **Recommendation**

Accordingly, it is recommended that the District Court dismiss the complaint

in the above-captioned case *without prejudice* and without issuance and service of process. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (as soon as possible after docketing, district courts should review prisoner cases to determine whether they are subject to summary dismissal). The plaintiff's attention is directed to the notice on the following page.

s/Bruce Howe Hendricks  
United States Magistrate Judge

November 16, 2009  
Greenville, South Carolina

## **Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation**

The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Court Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. In the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must “only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” *Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co.*, 416 F.3d 310 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2005).

Specific written objections must be filed within ten (10) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). The time calculation of this ten-day period excludes weekends and holidays and provides for an additional three (3) days for filing by mail. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a) & (e). Filing by mail pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:

Larry W. Propes, Clerk  
United States District Court  
Post Office Box 10768  
Greenville, South Carolina 29603

**Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation.** 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); *Thomas v. Arn*, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); *Wright v. Collins*, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); *United States v. Schronce*, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).